Lectures 06 and 07 - Coordination and variety by Figini, Paolo
coordination and variety
the fundamental economic problems for the destination are:
 the COORDINATION of the whole tourism product;
 the supply of VARIETY within the tourism product;
 to COMPLETE the tourism product through the supply of PUBLIC GOODS;
 to TACKLE EXTERNALITIES.
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coordination and variety (2)
the development strategy of the destination can be analysed as a two-stage 
problem:
 first stage: the optimal amount of local resources (a COMMON GOOD), 
hospitality and variety of the local goods is found;
 second stage, the equilibrium price for the goods and services included in the 
tourism product (ANTICOMMON GOOD) is set. 
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stage 1 – sophistication in the destination: the 
intuition
how many types of beach 
there are in the world?
set up of the model
DEMAND SIDE: 
 the consumer has to decide how to allocate a given income between a set of 
consumption goods (y) and a tourism product (T) in which there is a local resource 
(R) of quality (z), hospitality (h) and a variety of complementary goods and 
services (xi).
ASSUMPTIONS:
 the higher z, the higher the utility;
 the higher xi the higher the utility;
 the higher H (overnight stays), the lower z, the lower the utility.
SUPPLY SIDE 
 the destination's goal is to maximize overall tourism expenditure, that is: 
*;
 * is the minimum threshold of economic sustainability;
 K represents the costs borne for enhancing the endowment of resources 
and for attaining environmental sustainability;
ASSUMPTIONS
 tourism resources (R > 0) represent the main reason for the trip.
 the overall level of R depends on EXOGENOUS (the endowment provided 
by nature, history and culture) and ENDOGENOUS factors (depending on 
the investment undertaken by the local community, both public and private 
sector). 
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stage 1 – the optimal level of 
tourism sophistication
ASSUMPTIONS (continued)
 the quality (z) of the resource inversely depends on the number of overnight 
stays (because of CONGESTION and crowding effects);
 there is only one hospitality firm (monopolistic sector) h;
 the variety of the tourism product is measured through n ≥ 1, the number of 
local firms offering goods or services that compose the tourism bundle; the 
higher the number n, the greater the level of sophistication (the 
variety) of the tourism product.
 * is assumed to be exogenously given;
 prices are also assumed to be given (in the first stage only).
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stage 1 – the optimal level of 
tourism sophistication (2)
the love for variety theorem
“the reorganization of the tourism destination toward increasing the 
variety of available goods and services raises the tourists' 
welfare and their availability to spend on tourism, so to shift 
income from non-tourism to tourism consumption. Regardless 
any possible congestion effect and externalities on the 
environment, the increased variety will likely stimulate the 
economic development of the destination”. (Candela & Figini, 
2012, chp. 3)
the love for variety theorem (2)
the destination management can trigger tourism development by:
 investing in the existing resources;
 increasing the "degree of sophistication” of the tourism product;
 trying to find a balance between investment in resources and enhancement 
of variety
the strategy depends on the functional form of , which depends on H(R, n) 
and on X(R, n), and z(R):
 N  H   ;
 but : H  z   .

11
Stage 2 – coordination in the
 destination: the intuition
tourism in the destination is interpreted as a 'permission to stay' granted by the 
several firms supplying complementary services for tourists:
TOURISM IS AN ANTICOMMON
12
stage 2 – coordination in the
destination: the intuition (2)
+
= lack of coordination
In quality
= lack of coordination
In quantity+
local firms and the hospitality service h need to be coordinated in their 
quantities, quality and prices, in order to build a suitable product for meeting 
the tourism demand;
 coordination in quantity and quality is assumed to be already solved, so 
the relevant issue is COORDINATION IN PRICES;
 we release from stage 1 the assumption of given prices: all local firms are 
now (partially) price makers, as they enjoy a certain degree of monopoly 
power;
 the market regime is of monopolistic competition.
 
three possible organizational structures can be identified:
A) no coordination;
B) coordination through the destination management; 
C) coordination through a tour operator.
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stage 2 – price coordination in the
destination
14
stage 2 – price coordination
in the destination (2)
A. no coordination: firms individually decide the best pricing strategy in order to 
maximize own profits: 
– maxphh = phH; maxp = pX
B. coordination through the destination management: the DM maximizes 
overall tourism expenditure:
– maxph,p = phH + npX 
since goods are complementary and assuming that the perception of quality (z) is 
elastic to the crowding (H) prices are lower and  is higher in case B:
– coordination internalizes the effects resulting from the existing 
complementarity.
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stage 2 – price coordination
in the destination (3)
C. coordination through the market: the tour operator solves the anticommon 
problem by stipulating contracts with hotels and local firms with a discount.
 the tour operator then promotes and sells individual services within an all-
inclusive holiday package;
 in doing so, it partially bears the risk of no sale.
maxph,p  = vH – (ph – dh)H – n(p – d)X  – C2 
s.t. (ph – dh)H  h1 ;
(p – d)X  1 
it can easily be demonstrated that solution (C) equals solution (B)
Simple case with hotel and restaurant and linear demand functions:
N = a – v and v = ph + pr
the solutions are...
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stage 2 – price coordination
in the destination (4)
CASE A 
without 
coordination
CASE B with 
central 
authority
CASE C 
private 
coordination
N a/3 a/2 a/2
p(h) a/3 a/4 (a/3) - d
p(r) a/3 a/4 (a/3) - d
v 2a/3 a/2 a/2
Profit a2/9 a2/8 a2/9
d - - a/9
given the anti-common nature of the tourism product, coordination 
among firms in the destination, which can either be provided by the 
destination management or by the tour operator, increases tourism 
expenditure.
a corollary - when coordination is provided by a foreign tour 
operator, profits of the local firms are lower than in the case of 
coordination provided by the destination management.
– the type of coordination chosen in the destination is 
therefore not distribution neutral.
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stage 2 – the coordination theorem
a sort of taxonomy of destinations
we provide a theoretical basis for the plurality of real-world destinations.
 as regards sophistication, we can list: resource based destinations, 
sophistication based destinations, mixed based destinations.
 as regards coordination, we can list: community based destinations, 
centrally managed destinations, corporate based destinations
in total, we identify nine types of destinations, plus non tourism destinations, 
regions in which tourism is not economically viable.
our set-up has more explanatory power than the TALC model (Butler, 1980) and 
Plog (1974) model, that are merely descriptive:
 it does not reduce the development trajectory at one;
 it explains why destinations can be locked in a given phase or jump it all 
together.
conclusions
our approach analyses the diversity of destinations and of their development 
strategies by focussing on: 
 the sophistication of the tourism product (this aspect is related to the 
long-term development strategy);
 the intra-destination price coordination (this aspect is related to the short-
term pricing strategy).
open problems to be addressed:
– overcome some simplifying assumption (i.e., regarding the COST 
FUNCTION of TOs and DM);
– include the effect of different pricing strategy due to the type of 
tourism hosted by the destination (SNOB/BANDWAGON effect);
– overcome the two-stage with a SIMULTANEOUS MODEL (done, 
Andergassen, Candela & Figini, 2016);
– introduce competition WITHIN and ACROSS destinations.
The Tourist Area Life Cycle - TALC
application of the product life-cycle model to the tourism destination (TALC  
-Tourist Area Life Cycle)
caveats of the model:
• the shape of the curve can 
vary a lot ;
• the process can stop in a 
step of the cycle.
purely descriptive model
fascinating but not robust
 Real and organizational restyling
The Tourist Area Life Cycle – TALC (2)
tourists and evolution of destinations
the phases of development of the destination are linked to the type of hosted 
tourists: Package holiday / independent tourists.
private sector local control → public sector local control → international control 
phases of the
destination
life cycle of the
destination
the phases of the 
destination and the tourists 
(Plog, 1974)
• psychocentrics;
• allocentrics.
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